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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SCOTIA PATROLMEN'S BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-16861 
VILLAGE OP SCOTIA, 
Respondent. 
6RASSO & 6RASS0 (JANE K. FININ of counsel), for Charging 
Party 
60LDBER6ER & GOLDBERGER (BRYAN J. GOLDBERGER of counsel), 
for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Scotia 
Patrolmen's Benevolent Association (PBA) to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALT) on its charge against the Village 
of Scotia (Village). The PBA alleges that the Village demoted 
and disciplined police officer Timothy Macfarlane for comments he 
made in a letter he wrote to the Village's Board of Trustees 
which were critical of the Village's Chief of Police and Mayor. 
It also alleges that Macfarlane's discipline constituted a 
unilateral change in the standards governing police officers' 
conduct. These actions are alleged to have violated §209-a.l(a), 
(c) and (d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). 
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After a hearing, the ALJ dismissed the charge. The 
interference and discrimination allegations under §209-a.l(a) and 
(c) were dismissed because the ALJ determined that the part of 
the letter for which Macfarlane was admittedly demoted and 
disciplined did not constitute concerted protected activity under 
the Act. The refusal to bargain allegation under §209-a.l(d) was 
dismissed upon a finding that Macfarlane's discipline did not 
constitute a change in prevailing departmental disciplinary 
policy or practice. 
The PBA argues in its exceptions that the ALJ should not 
have given collateral estoppel effect to the findings and 
conclusions of a Civil Service Law (CSL) §75 hearing officer who 
had found Macfarlane guilty of a number of misconduct charges/ 
all centering on the letter he had written. The PBA argues that 
the ALJ also erred in concluding that Macfarlane's letter was not 
protected under the Act and in finding that his discipline did 
not constitute a bargainable change in disciplinary policy and 
practice. 
The Village argues that the ALJ did not give collateral 
estoppel effect to the CSL §75 hearing officer's findings and 
that his own decision on the merits of the charge was correct on 
the facts and law in all respects. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties7 
arguments, we reverse the ALJ's decision in part and affirm in 
part. 
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Although the ALJ made reference to collateral estoppel, it 
is clear from his decision that he did not apply that doctrine in 
dismissing the charge. The issues in this case are entirely 
distinct from those raised and decided under the disciplinary 
charges and collateral estoppel does not apply to prevent us from 
deciding an alleged improper practice within our exclusive 
jurisdiction under §205.5(d) of the Act. Although expressing his 
agreement with the CSL hearing officer's decision, which found 
that Macfarlane had violated departmental rules of conduct by 
making the statements about the Chief of Police and Mayor in his 
letter, the ALJ stated specifically that he was not bound by that 
determination. Instead, the ALJ reached his own merits 
determination on the charge before him and held Macfarlane's 
letter unprotected under the Act and his demotion and discipline, 
accordingly, not an improper practice. We now turn to those 
issues. 
Macfarlane is the PBA's former president and was its vice-
president on the relevant dates. His letter arose out of a 
lengthy dispute between the Village and the PBA over the 
Village's participation in a centralized 911 dispatch system. 
The PBA was concerned that the proposed system might impact upon 
the work of its unit employees. Macfarlane, who also served as a 
representative on the PBA dispatch committee, and other PBA 
officers, wrote letters to the Village critical of the proposed 
dispatch plan, negotiations about it were demanded, and an 
improper practice charge was threatened. 
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On April 11, 1995, Macfarlane wrote a two-page letter to the 
Village trustees about various issues involving the merits of the 
proposed dispatching system. Macfarlane's letter was in part a 
response to a letter to the editor of a local newspaper written 
by the Chief of Police. The Chief's letter to the editor was 
itself a response to a March 24 letter to the editor from 
Macfarlane. 
Macfarlane's March 24 letter to the editor is critical of 
the dispatch proposal, and in it, Macfarlane questions the 
Mayor's motivation for a plan which Macfarlane believed would 
cede the Village's control to another municipality and "lock up 
our building, reduce services and still have the villagers pay 
the town $60,000." 
In the Chief's letter to the editor, he characterizes 
Macfarlane's March 24 statements as "untrue", or ones based upon 
a "distortion of the truth" or a "misunderstanding" of the 
proposal. The Chief offers in his letter a summary of the 
proposed dispatch system, its cost, an explanation as to why 
decisions regarding certain features were made, and a defense of 
the Mayor's efforts to solicit comments from all affected by the 
proposal. 
Macfarlane's April 11 letter to the Village trustees was not 
on PBA letterhead,-' although it was delivered to the trustees 
in a sealed PBA envelope. Like his March 24 letter to the 
-'The record shows that Macfarlane simply did not have letterhead 
available when he wrote the letter. 
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editor, Macfarlane's April 11 letter was signed by him 
individually. Macfarlane was demoted and disciplined for only 
one paragraph in this letter. We have set forth the complete 
text of the letter to place Macfarlane's comments in proper 
context. That part of the letter which formed the basis for 
Macfarlane's demotion and discipline is underlined. 
Dear Trustees, 
I would like to touch on a few points regarding the 
dispatch issue that have come up over the past few weeks. 
A. The letter to the editor from Dispatcher Gallop is so 
distorted that it will undoubtedly confuse many Scotians. 
Including: the figures I stated came from the Village, not 
from me; Scotia was not the hold up on 911. We were tested 
and were ready several weeks ago, the hold up is radio 
equipment for SP Duanesburg (June 95); Mr. Gallop-a janitor 
with 2 weeks dispatcher training is not more qualified than 
a trained, certified police officer! Using Montgomery 
County's 911 as an example of what they can do, shows me 
that he did not read the Article 4 weeks ago in the Gazette 
explaining how messed up their 911 system is. Mr. Gallop 
is a frustrated "want a be" and is trying to kiss up to the 
chief to get the park watchman position he asked for. Why 
didn't he suggest also locking up the Glenville Police 
Station and save the Town the cost of 9 employees if it is 
such a great idea? Mr. Gallops [sic] comments about this 
department were totally unprofessional, uncalled for and 
untrue! I would hope Chief Purdy would correct his 
employee and ask for a public apology. The sad part of the 
editorial is that some people from Scotia may believe it... 
B. It is the Chief's letter to the editor I find more 
interesting. As president of the PBA when Paul Bovarin 
came to Scotia and current VP. I have made it very clear to 
our members that Chief Boyarin is a provisional chief and 
as such is subject to the whim and pleasure of the Mayor. 
Until he becomes permanent (10/95?) and can speak freely he 
is a tool of the Mayor. With this in mind we have not said 
anything to, for, or against the Chief, and have kept him 
out of our comments about plan, three etc. I was very 
surprised fas were many people I talked to) that the Chief 
of Police would jump into this political pot to publicly 
shaft his men and the P.B.A. and suck up to the Mayor in 
the same article. This was uncalled for and did harm to 
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the Department and the Chief's image. His comments about 
911 I also disagree with. In our meetings with the Mayor, 
they will not allow us to discuss any other plans, only 
plan three. They have not produced any procedures that 
they say they have in place (in the article). They have no 
written figures or proposals from the Town about this 
$60,000 figure (20% of $300,000) and when we show that this 
is not possible, they now say this amount will now be 
smaller. Where does this come from? The article said that 
the Town plan will handle our workload, the Town has 
already planned to have two dispatchers working 911 before 
this plan three was even thought of, our workload has not 
even been considered... The Chiefs' [sic] article stated 
they have control of the dispatchers already worked out. 
Ask to see this plan. Who will be on this committee? Who 
are we turning total control of the Village police services 
over to? We have shown that by hiring two more police 
officers, we would have the same staffing result and it 
would only cost about $20,000 more (2 officers $80,000-
$60,000 above =$20,000). I also believe that we can get 
three civilians for the above $60,000 and cover the off 
day, with current staff (like Niskayuna does). I believe 
that we could also use Denise Malcolm at the desk and then 
only have to hire one person to get the same desired 
policemen on the street. Why aren't these options being 
looked at? I agree that our current staffing level is a 
problem. But, the Chief has taken the D/C from the desk 
position, (always worked 4-12 in the past), Malcolm's issue 
is still on hold, Clark is still in school and Dick is out 
with a broken leg. These are four positions that we are 
short. These are not the men's fault and beyond our 
control. I believe the Chief is taking advantage of a 
short term problem with an overkill solution. Remember we 
did try using a civilian at the desk many years ago, and 
gave up on the idea when the officer had to keep being 
called back to the station. Many of our calls are resolved 
at the desk and over the phone just by having a police 
officer handle the calls. We solved a felony DWI hit and 
run this past Saturday within minutes; simply because the 
witness was able to walk into the station. 
I believe that Glenville could handle the 911 with the 
transfer to the Scotia PD and Scotia FD by a one button 
transfer (my 4 year old can press a "P" for police and "F" 
for fire) without any problems or loss of services to the 
village... But to decrease services and increase cost to 
the Village makes no sense to me. Unlike the above two 
people I have no personal gain either way. 
Although no one will admit it, I believe that this is no 
more than a back-door consolidation plan. If the phones 
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are gone, the radio dispatch is gone and the 911 is gone, 
the only thing left is to change the color of the cars! 
(if it walks like a duck... its [sic] a duck.) If this is 
the Villages [sic] plan, lets [sic] be open about it and 
put it on the ballot and be done with it. Whatever the 
Villagers decide, do it. 
If you wish to talk to me about this, or any other issue, I 
can be reached at 382-0527. 
Thank you for taking the time to listen to me. 
The ALJ found Macfarlane's comments unprotected under the 
Act for two reasons. First, the ALJ concluded that Macfarlane's 
comments "bore no indicia of union involvement." Second, the ALJ 
held that the content of the statements themselves deprived 
Macfarlane of the Act's protections because the "offending 
language is so egregious as to overstep the bounds of propriety." 
As such, the ALJ held that Macfarlane's comments were neither 
concerted nor protected under the Act. We disagree with both 
conclusions and, therefore, reverse the ALJ's dismissal of the 
§209-a.l(a) and (c) allegations. 
As to the concerted-7 nature of Macfarlane's letter, it did 
not represent, as the ALJ apparently concluded, merely 
Macfarlane's individual opinion on a matter of personal concern 
to him only. Whether the paragraph for which Macfarlane was 
disciplined and demoted is read apart from the rest of his letter 
or, as we believe it must for purposes of the Act, in the context 
of the whole letter and the circumstances leading up to it, the 
g/See generally New York City Transit Auth. , 20 PERB J[3065, aff'g 
20 PERB f4575 (1987). 
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statements therein clearly are intended to reflect the position 
of the PBA and its membership, and were written on their 
collective behalf. 
Macfarlane's status as a PBA officer and PBA dispatch 
committee member was well known to all of the Village officials. 
Macfarlane's letter refers to his PBA office and to conversations 
he had had with the PBA membership concerning the Chief generally 
and with specific reference to the Village's dispatch proposal. 
There are references to "we" and "our" throughout the letter. 
Macfarlane's testimony also establishes that he issued the letter 
in his capacity as a PBA officer and representative and intended 
to convey the position of the PBA, an intent confirmed by 
Theodore Cayer, the PBA secretary. Macfarlane and Cayer 
discussed the letter before it was sent to the Village trustees. 
Although Cayer was personally uncomfortable with some of the 
statements in the letter, including the statements about the 
Chief, Cayer approved the release of the letter as written on 
behalf of the PBA because he did not believe it was "too 
offensive" and he believed that there was not enough time to edit 
the letter and retype it onto PBA letterhead before the Village 
trustees were scheduled to meet about the dispatch proposal. 
Cayer, as did Macfarlane, considered the letter to be "a 
statement by the PBA of the PBA position" consistent with the 
PBA's practice of having "the president or the other officers ... 
basically guide the PBA." 
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The basis for the ALJ's conclusion that Macfarlane's letter 
was not concerted activity appears to be that the letter was not 
signed by Macfarlane with a reference to his PBA office and was 
not typed on PBA letterhead. The concerted nature of any 
activity, however, must be evaluated in the totality of all 
relevant circumstances, with a focus upon the purpose and effect 
of that activity. Although the factors noted by the AKT are 
relevant to an analysis regarding the concerted nature of 
Macfarlane's letter, they are not dispositive. Had we, for 
example, concluded on a totality-of-circumstances examination 
that Macfarlane's statements represented only his personal 
opinion in pursuit of purely personal interests, the simple 
expedient of his typing the letter on PBA letterhead and signing 
it over a line giving his union office would not have served to 
convert that individual activity into concerted activity. If the 
presence of those factors would not be dispositive, then their 
absence is no more conclusive. Under the same reasoning, 
delivery of the letter in the PBA envelope, although relevant, 
does not itself make the letter concerted. Ultimately, it is the 
content of the letter as a whole in light of all relevant 
surrounding circumstances which determines the concerted nature 
of Macfarlane's comments. Examining those relevant 
circumstances, we find the letter and the paragraph for which 
Macfarlane was disciplined and demoted to have been concerted 
activity because there was concert in fact by Macfarlane who 
undertook action after discussion with and on behalf of other 
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employees to protest a matter that was of known group and 
organizational concern. 
This brings us to the second basis for the AKT's decision on 
the interference and discrimination allegations. Not only must 
the activity be concerted - as we have found Macfarlane's letter 
to be - it must also be protected in its nature. The ALJ 
concluded that the part of the letter for which Macfarlane was 
demoted and disciplined was not protected because the comments 
were offensive, egregious and overstepped the bounds of 
propriety. We disagree with the ALJ's conclusion. 
Our case law clearly emphasizes the breadth of protection 
afforded by the Act to employee speech and the expression of 
opinion regarding employment issues, particularly statements made 
by representatives of the employees' bargaining agent. We have 
protected a range of employee speech^7 because we believe firmly 
that the labor relations process must tolerate robust debate of 
employment issues, even if occasionally intemperate. 
Although conveyed with an unfortunate choice of words -
which we certainly do not condone - Macfarlane's message in the 
paragraph for which he was demoted and disciplined is not 
particularly controversial or offensive in a labor relations 
setting. Discussion regarding the Village's dispatch proposal, 
-''See, e.cr. , Binqhamton City Sch. Dist. , 22 PERB f3034 (1989) 
(unit president's public statement that supervisor had lied 
during arbitration hearing); Plainedge Pub. Sch., 13 PERB 13037 
(1980)(inaccurate and exaggerated public statements critical of 
employer's proposed policy); Ellenville Cent. Sch. Dist., 9 PERB 
f3067 (1976)(vulgar reference directly to and about supervisor). 
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for example, had been heated on both sides. In the very letter 
which triggered Macfarlane's April 11 letter, the Chief of Police 
characterizes Macfarlane's previous statements in opposition to 
the dispatch proposal as lies, distortions or the product of a 
misunderstanding. The content of the paragraph for which 
Macfarlane was demoted and disciplined was that the Chief had to 
defend a proposal even he considered unwise because a permanent 
job was dependent upon the Mayor's approval of the Chief's 
actions and statements, a circumstance the PBA believed should 
diminish the weight which the Village's Board of Trustees would 
normally give to the opinion of the Chief concerning a 
departmental matter. The letter goes on to state that the PBA 
considered the proposal and the Chief's support of it to be 
detrimental to the best interests of the Village residents, the 
PBA membership and the police department. 
If the paragraph for which Macfarlane was demoted and 
disciplined had been written as summarized above, there could be 
little question as to the protected nature of such statements. 
To hold the statements unprotected, not because of their message, 
but because of the words used to convey it, would make the scope 
of protection afforded under the Act to statements by employees 
about their employment relationship dependent upon the ability of 
speakers or writers to express themselves in a manner which might 
be considered polite or civil in general society. Even were we 
able to define some minimum standard of labor relations civility 
which would serve to guide employees and their representatives, 
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the Act's protections are not, cannot, and should not be 
restricted to the best educated and most articulate among those 
who are elected or choose to protect and advance the employment 
interests of an employer's employees. 
We are also cognizant of the need to consider the context 
and the recipients of the words and the message conveyed by them 
in determining whether statements are protected by the Act. Had 
Macfarlane's statements been made to the Chief in the presence of 
the police department staff, their impact on the Chief's 
authority would be more of an issue to consider. Similarly, if 
the letter had been published in the local press (as had some of 
Macfarlane's previous letters), its distribution to the public 
might have been a factor to be considered. However, the letter 
in this case was sent to the legislative body of the employer as 
part of a political process, which the Act acknowledges is 
intertwined in the collective bargaining process, in an effort by 
the PBA to persuade the legislative body not to take an action 
the PBA believed would be detrimental to the interests of the 
public, the PBA and the department. In this context, latitude of 
expression is properly afforded under the Act. 
We fully realize that there may be times when the words 
chosen to convey a message may be so extreme as to render the 
statements containing those words themselves unprotected under 
the Act, notwithstanding the legitimacy of the message being 
conveyed or the identity or status of the person or persons 
making them. We conclude, however, for the reasons set forth 
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above, that Macfarlane's statements in this case are not of that 
type. 
Our decision in Kincrs Point Central School District 
(hereafter Kings Point),-7 relied upon by the ALJ in dismissing 
the interference and discrimination aspects of the charge, is not 
inconsistent with or contrary to our decision in this case. In 
Kings Point, an employee's letter to a board of education 
president contained a threat that the education of the board 
president's son, and other students whom the employee taught, 
would be made to suffer if an impasse in collective negotiations 
were not resolved quickly. It was the threatened enmeshing of 
students in the labor dispute which we held unprotected in Kings 
Park. Macfarlane's letter does not contain any threats of harm 
of any type and was restricted to an employment issue in dispute 
between the Village and the PBA, circumstances bearing no 
resemblance to those in Kings Point. 
As Macfarlane's comments constituted concerted protected 
activity under the Act, the Village was not permitted to subject 
Macfarlane to discipline or other adverse personnel action for 
having made those statements. As the Village's actions were 
admittedly taken because of the statements Macfarlane made, it 
violated §209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Act. 
The refusal to bargain allegation, premised upon a 
unilateral change in practice regarding standards of employee 
^24 PERB f3026 (1991). 
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conduct, was properly dismissed by the ALJ. The basis for the 
misconduct charges against Macfarlane rests in existing 
departmental rules. That no officer has previously been 
disciplined for misconduct arising from oral or written comments 
made in alleged violation of those rules is immaterial. An 
employer does not unilaterally change a disciplinary system 
grounded upon misconduct by charging an employee with misconduct 
upon specifications which have not arisen before. To hold 
otherwise would mean that every "first instance" discipline of an 
employee would constitute a unilateral change in terms and 
conditions of employment in violation of the bargaining 
obligations under the Act under even the broadest of disciplinary 
systems. 
For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's decision is 
reversed insofar as it dismisses the allegations that the Village 
violated §209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Act and is otherwise 
affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Village: 
1. Immediately restore Macfarlane to the rank of sergeant 
and to the duties and privileges appropriate to such 
rank. 
2. Make Macfarlane whole for any loss of wages or benefits 
occasioned by the loss of sergeant rank and by the 
discipline imposed pursuant to the disciplinary charges 
filed against him, with interest at the currently 
prevailing maximum legal rate. 
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3. Expunge from any personnel or employment records any 
reference to Macfarlane's loss of rank or to any 
discipline imposed upon him as a result of his 
April 11, 1995 letter to the Village Board of Trustees. 
4. Post notice in the form attached in all locations 
ordinarily used by the Village to post notices of 
information to employees in the unit represented by the 
PBA. 
DATED: November 20, 1996 
Albany, New York 
gjb^f LJl J=*~ 
Pau l ine R. K m s e l l a , Chairperson 
E r i c Of. Schmertz, MemBer 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the unit represented by the Scotia Patrolmen's Benevolent Association that the Village of 
Scotia (Village) will: 
1. Immediately restore Timothy Macfarlane to the rank of sergeant and to the duties and privileges 
appropriate to such rank. 
2. Make Timothy Macfarlane whole for any loss of wages or benefits occasioned by the loss of sergeant 
rank and by the discipline imposed pursuant to the disciplinary charges filed against him, with 
interest at the currently prevailing maximum legal rate. 
3. Expunge from any personnel or employment records any reference to Timothy Macfarlane's loss of 
rank or to any discipline imposed upon him as a result of his April 11, 1995 letter to the Village's 
Board of Trustees. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
VILLAGE OF SCOTIA 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
GENESEE EDUCATIONAL ASSOCIATION, NEA/NY, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-16937 
GENESEE COMMUNITY COLLEGE, 
Respondent. 
JANET AXELROD, GENERAL COUNSEL (HAROLD G. BEYER, JR. of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
ROBERT E. GRAY, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Genesee 
Educational Association, NEA/NY (Association) to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing its charge that the 
Genesee Community College (College) violated §209-a.l(c) and (d) 
of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
unilaterally implemented a new evaluation form for all 
nonteaching personnel in the unit represented by the Association. 
The parties' collective bargaining agreement, in effect 
through June 30, 1996, provides that evaluations are to be 
completed annually and 
will include a conference(s) between the individuals 
and their immediate supervisor, [and] a completed 
evaluation which will become part of the individual's 
professional file, which may be followed by individual 
conferences with appropriate administrative personnel. 
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The parties' contract also provides that 
to such extent as Board Policy #236^ applies to unit 
members on continuing contracts and is not inconsistent 
with this Agreement, the evaluation standards therein 
set forth shall be controlling. Except as may be 
otherwise provided in this Agreement, the Board retains 
exclusive authority to amend and set policy relating to 
faculty evaluation but shall consult with the 
Association not less than thirty (30) days prior to any 
-
7As here relevant, Board Policy #236 provides: 
The evaluation of non-teaching staff with continuing 
appointments shall be referenced to one or more 
performance standards. Supervisors may establish a 
plan of performance standards for any staff member 
holding a continuing appointment covering two or more 
years, but no such plan shall exceed the length of the 
appointment period. 
Performance standards shall be developed by supervisors 
in consultation with affected staff members and 
furnished to the latter in a timely manner; and they 
shall be addressed to any facet of professional 
responsibility including specific items in position 
descriptions and professional growth and development. 
The annual evaluation of each non-teaching staff member 
on continuing appointment may involve, besides 
performance standards, the use of one method of 
evaluation chosen by supervisors after consultation 
with affected staff members. 
Methods of evaluation for non-teaching staff members 
include: peer evaluation, self critique, user/client 
evaluation, critiques of materials and procedures 
developed and implemented by the non-teaching staff 
member> or any other method which in the judgement of 
the supervisor discloses the substance of job 
responsibilities. If using the method of user/client 
evaluation, non-teaching staff members may choose or 
design the form to be administered to users/clients, 
after consultation with their respective supervisors, 
but the administration and collection of forms and 
tabulation of responses therein shall be handled by 
some other professional staff member designated by the 
supervisor. 
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change in said Board policy #236 which relates to 
evaluation standards. Any such change will be 
prospective in effect. 
In March 1995, the College announced that a new form would 
be used to evaluate nonteaching academic affairs employees. 
Thereafter, a unit employee, Lisa Giallella, was evaluated by her 
supervisor, John Murray, interim Associate Dean of Off-Campus 
Affairs. For previous evaluations, Giallella had used 
information that she had gathered to establish that she had 
achieved the goals set for her in prior evaluations. Her 
previous supervisor had used a two-page narrative evaluation 
form, with spaces for the supervisor to comment on "methods of 
evaluation used since last evaluation" and "supervisor's 
recommendation for action". For the evaluation conducted in 
April 1995, Murray used the new evaluation form, which is nine 
pages in length and which measures numerous criteria for 
"behavior" in seven separate "skill categories",-7 with spaces 
for the supervisor's comments. The form also has a one-page 
space for the supervisor's comments on "evaluation of previous 
performance standards" and a similar space for comments about the 
coming year's performance standards. In preparation for the 
evaluation, Murray instructed Giallella to provide documentation 
in support of her achievement of the goals established in her 
-'The skills evaluated are: initiative, integrity, tenacity, 
oral communication, functional/technical, organizing, and 
thoroughness. 
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prior evaluation. Giallella compiled the information as 
instructed and filled in her rankings on the new evaluation form. 
The ALT found that there had been no change in the procedure 
because Giallella had, as before, gathered information relevant 
to her performance evaluation and had met with her supervisor. 
The AKT also found that the form merely reflected new performance 
evaluation criteria established by the College. Noting that the 
criteria upon which employees are evaluated are nonmandatory 
subjects of negotiation,-7 the ALT determined that the College 
had not violated §209-a.l(d) of the Act.^7 
The Association excepts to the ALT's decision, arguing that 
the ALT erred in concluding that the change in the evaluation 
form was not mandatorily negotiable and in concluding that 
Giallella was not compelled to perform a self-evaluation beyond 
the scope of those she had done previously. The College has not 
filed a response. 
Based upon a review of the record and consideration of the 
parties7 arguments, we affirm the ALT's dismissal of the charge, 
although on jurisdictional grounds. 
The parties' collective bargaining agreement sets forth in 
detail the evaluation procedure and incorporates by reference 
Board Policy #236, which not only further details the evaluation 
'^Elwood Union Free Sch. Dist. . 10 PERB ^3107 (1977) . 
-
7The ALT dismissed the §209-a.l(c) allegation as no facts were 
alleged and no proof offered which would support the finding of 
such a violation. No exceptions were taken to this 
determination. 
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procedure, but also covers evaluation standards and criteria. We 
have held repeatedly that the jurisdictional limits of §205.5(d) 
of the Act are triggered if the contract is a reasonably arguable 
source of right to a charging party with respect to the subject 
matter of its charge.-7 We do not have jurisdiction over 
violations of an existing contract under §205.5(d). The charge 
alleges changes in evaluation standards and procedures which 
arguably violate those parts of the parties7 contract regarding 
conferencing and consultation prior to making such changes. As 
we are without jurisdiction over this charge, we make no 
determination as to whether the establishment and use of an 
evaluation form which includes new evaluation criteria would 
violate the Act. 
Based on the foregoing, the Association's exceptions are 
denied. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: November 20, 1996 
Albany, New York 
2/See County of Nassau. 23 PERB f3051 (1990) . 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF CARMEL POLICE BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-17383 
TOWN OF CARMEL, 
Respondent. 
RAYMOND 6. KRUSE, P.C. (RAYMOND 6. KRUSE of counsel), for 
Charging Party 
ANDERSON, BANKS, CURRAN & DONOGHUE (STUART S. WAXMAN of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Town of 
Carmel Police Benevolent Association, Inc. (PBA) to a decision by 
an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) rendered on the PBA's charge 
against the Town of Carmel (Town). In relevant part, the PBA 
alleges in its charge that the Town violated §209-a.l(d) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally 
changed a practice pursuant to which unit employees were granted 
vacation time which overlapped vacation time selected by other 
police department personnel so long as predetermined minimum 
staffing levels were maintained. 
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After a hearing, the ALJ dismissed the charge on the ground 
that the restrictions on overlapping vacations effected by the 
Town's change in the prior practice were not mandatory subjects 
of negotiation because, by restricting overlapping, the Town was 
determining the number of employees who would be on duty at any 
given time. Citing the Board's decision in City of Yonkers.-7 
the ALJ held that the number of employees who are to be on duty 
at any one time is a decision which an employer need not 
negotiate. 
The PBA argues that the ALJ's decision is factually and 
legally incorrect. The Town states in response that certain of 
the PBA's exceptions are themselves inaccurate. The Town 
otherwise argues that the ALJ's decision is correct on the 
material facts and the law and should be affirmed. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we conclude that the charge should be deferred and 
conditionally dismissed because it raises contractual questions 
arguably beyond our jurisdiction and which, to the extent the 
allegations may be within our jurisdiction, are better resolved, 
if possible, in the grievance arbitration context. 
Although this charge is pleaded as a unilateral change in 
practice, testimony at the hearing reveals clearly that the 
alleged practice which was changed was actually the subject of an 
^lO PERB 53056 (1977). 
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explicit agreement reached in December 1994 after negotiations 
between the parties. Those negotiations were held pursuant to 
the PBA's demand because the Town had also promulgated a policy 
that year which prohibited overlapping on any vacation 
selections. According to William Masterson, president of the 
PBA, "the final agreement out of the meeting was that overlapping 
would be permitted on vacation selection so long as we did not 
violate minimum manning and there would be no overlapping on the 
Fourth of July." 
The policy memorandum of October 1995, which is the subject 
of this charge, arguably violated that agreement. As we have no 
jurisdiction under §205.5(d) of the Act when an agreement is an 
arguable source of right to a charging party with respect to the 
subject matter of its improper practice charge,^ ordinarily we 
would unconditionally dismiss this charge for lack of 
jurisdiction.-7 It is not clear from the record, however, that 
the vacation pick agreement was in effect at the relevant date. 
Although there is no fixed duration to this agreement, it 
concerned vacation picks for 1995. As such, it is possible that 
the parties intended the agreement to a vacation pick system to 
be in effect for 1995 only. Questions concerning the parties' 
intent regarding the duration of their agreement are best 
^See, e.g.. County of Nassau, 23 PERB 13051 (1990). 
S/Citv of Glens Falls. 25 PERB f3011 (1992), conf'd. 195 A.D.2d 
933, 26 PERB f7009 (3d Dep't 1993) (arguable breach of oral 
agreement revealed for first time at hearing). 
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resolved, if possible, in the context of the parties7 grievance 
arbitration procedure^7 rather than by us. 
We already have an established policy of deferring 
jurisdictional questions when a contractual grievance has been 
filed.-' Even though a grievance has not been filed in this 
case, we advance the policy rationale underlying such deferral by 
declining to reach, unless later necessary, what is essentially a 
question of arbitrability arising from the uncertain duration of 
this agreement and the applicability of the parties7 grievance 
arbitration procedure to this agreement. A contractual grievance 
filed hereafter by the PBA should permit for a determination as 
to whether the vacation pick agreement reached in 1994 was in 
) effect at the relevant date and whether the grievance procedure 
applies to this dispute. Should the Town successfully raise in 
the grievance arbitration context any argument which forecloses a 
determination regarding the merits of the PBA7s grievance, the 
PBA may move to reopen this charge for a determination regarding 
the jurisdictional issue raised on the existing record. We see 
no prejudice to either the PBA or the Town by our deferral of the 
jurisdictional issue and we promote the policies of the Act by 
avoiding an interpretation of contract which the legislature has 
declared is preferably made by others in different forums. 
^We take administrative notice of the parties7 contract last 
filed with us pursuant to §214.1 of our Rules of Procedure, which 
contains a grievance arbitration procedure. 
;
 ^Herkimer County BOCES, 20 PERB 13050 (1987). 
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Wholly apart from our jurisdictional deferral policy, we 
also have had a much longer standing policy of deferring the 
determination of the merits of refusal to bargain charges within 
our jurisdiction.-7 When, as here, the disposition of a refusal 
to bargain charge necessitates an interpretation of an agreement 
which is arguably a source of right to the charging party, and an 
award rendered under a binding grievance arbitration procedure is 
potentially dispositive of the issues underlying the charge, we 
have been persuaded that the policies of the Act favoring an 
accommodation of the parties' dispute resolution procedures are 
again advanced by a conditional dismissal of the charge, even 
when the charging party union has elected not to invoke the 
grievance arbitration provisions of its contract.-7 Therefore, 
even were we willing to assume that the vacation pick agreement 
expired in 1995, such that we were not presented with any 
jurisdictional issue, we would still defer any determination 
regarding the merits of this charge to the parties' uninvoked 
grievance arbitration procedure. As with the jurisdictional 
deferral, our merits deferral will permit for a reopening of this 
charge on motion in appropriate circumstances. 
^New York City Transit Auth.. 4 PERB 53031 (1971); Citv of 
Buffalo. 4 PERB 13090 (1971). Our merits deferral has been 
judicially approved. CSEA v. PERB. 213 A.D.2d 897, 28 PERB J[7004 
(3d Dep't 1995). 
Z/City of Saratoga Springs. 18 PERB J[3009 (1985); Citv of 
Buffalo. 17 PERB 13090 (1984). 
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For the reasons set forth above, the charge is conditionally 
dismissed subject to a motion to reopen in accordance with our 
decision herein. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: November 20, 1996 
Albany, New York 
fr. L ^ T-, t vW\t*. 
PaulineyR. K m s e l r a , Chai rperson 
E r i c J/. Schmertz, Memb'er 
^ STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ROCHESTER POLICE LOCUST CLUB, INC., 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-16722 
CITY OF ROCHESTER, 
Respondent. 
HARRIS BEACH & WILCOX (LAWRENCE J. ANDOLINA of counsel), 
for Charging Party 
LINDA S. KINGSLEY, CORPORATION COUNSEL (YVETTE C. GREEN of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the City of 
Rochester (City) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) on a charge against the City filed by the Rochester Police 
Locust Club, Inc. (Locust Club). The Locust Club alleges in its 
charge that the City violated §209-a.l(a) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it refused the Locust 
Club's demand for certain factual information regarding police 
officers who are assigned as investigators. 
After a hearing, the ALJ held that the charge was timely 
filed, that the demand for information was reasonable and 
relevant both to the administration of the parties' collective 
bargaining agreement and to issues raised in negotiations which 
were then pending for resolution by an interest arbitration 
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panel, and that the information demanded was not exempt from 
disclosure either as attorney work product or material prepared 
solely for litigation. The ALJ held, therefore, that the City 
had violated the Act as alleged. 
The City argues in its exceptions that the charge is 
untimely, at least to the extent that it complains about the 
City's refusal to provide the Locust Club with a departmental 
document known as the "Weisner Report"; that the charge as filed 
concerns only the Weisner Report and, as such, the ALJ's order to 
produce anything other than that report exceeds the scope of the 
charge as filed; and finally, that the information demanded is 
not subject to compulsory disclosure under the Act because it is 
privileged. The Locust Club argues in its response that the 
ALJ's decision is correct and should be affirmed. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
As a threshold matter, we must address an issue which was 
not specifically discussed by the parties or the ALJ. A refusal 
to provide information is typically the subject of a charge 
alleging a refusal to negotiate under §209-a.l(d) of the Act. 
This charge alleges only a §209-a.l(a) violation. Section 
209-a.l(a) of the Act makes it improper for an employer to 
interfere with the statutory rights of its public employees. The 
question presented, therefore, is whether a refusal to provide 
information pursuant to demand which is relevant to a union's 
exercise of its rights and duties under the Act constitutes an 
Board - U-16722 -3 
interference with employees' rights. The parties and the ALJ 
have assumed that a refusal to provide such information, which is 
not otherwise exempt from disclosure, may constitute a violation 
of §209-a.l(a) of the Act. For the reasons set forth below, we 
so hold. 
Public employees' statutory rights of organization and 
representation have meaning only to the extent that their chosen 
bargaining agent is positioned to effectively represent their 
interests. The Act extends to a bargaining agent, both 
explicitly and implicitly, certain basic rights to give effect to 
the rights of the public employees represented by the bargaining 
agent. A right to the receipt of information relevant to 
collective negotiations and contract administration is one such 
fundamental right.-7 The denial of a reasonable demand for 
information which is relevant to collective negotiations, 
grievance adjustment, the administration of a collective 
bargaining agreement, or the resolution of impasses arising in 
the course of collective negotiations impairs the union's ability 
to effectively represent the interests of the employees in its 
unit. By rendering the union less able to represent the 
interests of its unit employees, an employer which improperly 
refuses a demand for information interferes per se with the 
statutory rights of its employees, in violation of §209-a.l(a) of 
the Act. 
^Board of Educ., City Sch. Dist. of the City of Albany, 6 PERB 
f3012 (1973). 
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Having concluded that §209-a.l(a) is applicable to an 
alleged improper refusal by an employer of a demand for 
information, we turn to the City's exceptions. All of the City's 
exceptions are based directly or indirectly on the claim that the 
Locust Club's January 25 demand for information was for a 
particular document, i.e., the Weisner Report. A demand for that 
document was made and refused earlier, but the demand in January 
was only for the following four specific pieces of factual 
information: 1) the names of the police officers assigned as 
investigators; 2) their current assignment; 3) their date of 
appointment; and 4) their date of assignment into positions where 
they performed the functions of an investigator. 
The Locust Club's demand for this information is not the 
same as its earlier demands for a copy of the Weisner Report, 
even if that document contained the information which was 
subsequently requested. As the charge was filed within four 
months of the City's refusal of the January demand for 
information only, the charge is timely. We do not decide, 
therefore, whether the charge would be timely under any other 
theory. 
As the demand refused was for specific information, not a 
departmental document, it is also clear that the City's various 
privilege defenses are inapplicable. The demand made in January 
was for factual information regarding departmental work 
assignments. Those facts existed apart from any litigation and 
they were not created as the product of any attorney's work. 
Board - U-16722 -5 
The incorporation of those facts into a document does not make 
the facts themselves privileged. Whether the Weisner Report 
would be privileged on these or other grounds is an issue which 
is simply not presented in this case. Although a comment made by 
the City's attorney during oral argument of a case before the 
Court of Appeals-7 triggered the Locust Club's January demand 
for information, that does not make the factual information 
sought pursuant to the demand privileged and exempt from 
disclosure. It is the nature of the information demanded which 
is relevant to any privilege defense, not the reasons prompting 
the demand. The information demanded in January was not 
privileged on the grounds asserted by the City. The Locust Club 
was not seeking any document prepared by an attorney or any 
material preparefor litigation, only some facts within the City's 
possession related to ongoing departmental operations and which 
existed independently of any attorney work product or litigation 
papers. Moreover, the City attorney's reference to and use of 
one of the facts made subject to the Locust Club's January demand 
for information, if anything, would seem to waive any privilege, 
even assuming one were to exist. 
The ALJ found the Locust Club's demand for information 
reasonable, relevant to the carrying out of its responsibilities 
under the Act, and not burdensome to the City. The City takes no 
-'That litigation involved a City police investigator who had 
sued the City because he had not received a permanent appointment 
to ah investigator's position. The City attorney's comment was 
about the number of officers assigned as investigators. 
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exception to these findings, with which we agree. The charge is 
timely, the City's refusal to provide the information demanded 
was not privileged, and the ALJ's decision and order is 
restricted to the charge as filed and established on the record. 
Accordingly, we affirm the ALT's decision. 
For the reasons set forth above, the City's exceptions are 
denied and the ALJ's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the City: 
1. Immediately provide to the Locust Club the information 
it requested on January 26, 1995 in regard to police 
officers assigned to the position or functions of 
investigator. 
2. Sign and post the notice in the form attached at all 
locations ordinarily used to post notices of 
information to employees in the unit represented by the 
Locust Club. 
DATED: November 20, 1996 
Albany, New York 
/ 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the unit represented by the Rochester Police Locust Club, Inc., that the City of Rochester 
will: 
1. Immediately provide to the Rochester Police Locust Club, Inc., the information it requested 
on January 26, 1995 in regard to police officers assigned to the position or functions of 
investigator. 
) 
Dated By . . . . . 
(Representative) (Title) 
CITY OF ROCHESTER 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
fr "ny other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MAHMOOD YOONESSI, M.D., 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-17976 
STATE OF NEW YORK (STATE UNIVERSITY OF 
NEW YORK AT BUFFALO) and UNITED 
UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS, 
Respondents. 
MAHMOOD M. YOONESSI, M.D., pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Mahmood M. 
Yoonessi, M.D., to a decision of the Acting Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Acting Director) 
dismissing his improper practice charge, which alleges that the 
State of New York (State University of New York at Buffalo) 
(State) and United University Professions (UUP) violated, 
respectively, §209-a.l(a) and (c) and §209-a.2(a) and (c) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) in the handling and 
settlement of several grievances filed by UUP on behalf of 
Yoonessi. 
Yoonessi was notified by the Acting Director that the charge 
was untimely in most respects and failed to set forth facts 
which, if proven, would support either a finding that the State 
had discriminated against Yoonessi for the exercise of rights 
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protected by the Act or that UUP's conduct was arbitrary, 
discriminatory or in bad faith. In response, Yoonessi filed an 
amendment to the charge, but the Acting Director, finding that 
the amendment had failed to correct the noted deficiencies, 
dismissed the charge. 
Yoonessi excepts to the Acting Director's decision on the 
grounds that his charge is not untimely and that new evidence, 
which he has included in his exceptions, establishes the alleged 
violations by the State and UUP. 
Based upon a review of the record and Yoonessi's arguments, 
we affirm the decision of the Acting Director. 
Yoonessi, a doctor and associate professor at the State 
University of New York at Buffalo School of Medicine from 1976 to 
1991, filed contract grievances relating to the management of 
clinical practice income, denial of due process, and harassment, 
and disciplinary grievances protesting misconduct charges. UUP 
processed each grievance through various stages of the grievance 
procedure, up to and including arbitration on his earliest 
grievances. Some grievances were held pending the outcome of the 
earlier grievances. Yoonessi was terminated by the State in 1991 
for failing to adhere to the terms of an earlier disciplinary 
arbitration award and for failing to follow appropriate billing 
and reimbursement procedures. Among the grievances UUP was 
pursuing for Yoonessi was a grievance challenging the 
termination. 
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In May 1996, UUP advised Yoonessi that it had entered into a 
settlement with the State of all the outstanding grievances.^ 
Yoonessi was to receive a lump sum settlement in the amount of 
$75,000, the State agreed that it would not interfere with his 
physician's privileges at any of its affiliated hospitals, and 
nothing in the agreement was to be construed as an admission of 
guilt or wrongdoing by any party to the agreement. All of the 
grievances were withdrawn with prejudice. Yoonessi did not agree 
with the settlement terms and filed this charge. 
Yoonessi's charge was filed with PERB on June 19, 1996. Any 
allegations which relate to actions by the State or UUP which 
occurred more than four months before that date are untimely.-' 
The only allegation in the charge which is timely relates to the 
UUP - State grievance settlement reached in May 1996. The Acting 
Director, therefore, correctly dismissed those aspects of the 
charge which occurred before February 19, 1996. 
As to the settlement of the grievances entered into by UUP 
and the State in May 1996, Yoonessi has provided no facts which 
would support a finding that the State was improperly motivated 
in reaching the grievance settlement or that UUP was arbitrary, 
discriminatory or acting in bad faith when it accepted the 
-'Yoonessi is also proceeding in the Court of Claims in an action 
against the State for monies he claims are due from his 
employment with the State. He is represented in that action by 
private counsel. By our decision in this case, we express no 
opinion regarding the merit of Yoonessi's claim. 
-'Rules of Procedure, §204.1(a). 
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settlement.-7 That the money portion of the settlement was far 
less than Yoonessi claims is due and owing to him does not by 
itself establish a violation of the Act by either the State or 
UUP. 
Yoonessi seeks by this charge a review of UUP's performance 
in the settlement of his several grievances. It is not the 
policy of this Board to substitute its view of a proper 
settlement for that reached by a union. Indeed, it has been 
long-recognized by labor relations agencies and the courts that 
any substantive examination of a union's performance, 
therefore, must be highly deferential, recognizing the 
wide latitude that negotiators need for the effective 
performance of their bargaining responsibilities. For 
that reason, the final product of the bargaining 
process may constitute evidence of a breach of the duty 
i only if it can be fairly characterized as so far 
outside a "wide range of reasonableness that it is 
wholly "irrational" or "arbitrary", (citations 
omitted)-7 
Here, Yoonessi offered evidence that his claim of the monies due 
him was far in excess of the monetary portion of the settlement 
agreement UUP reached with the State after pursuing numerous 
grievances for Yoonessi over several years. However, his own 
papers show that the settlement was multifaceted and avoided 
^Yoonessi included with his exceptions excerpts from a 
deposition in his case at the Court of Claims. We decline to 
accept such evidence, offered for the first time in Yoonessi's 
exceptions, because the deposition took place on June 18, 1996, 
the day before Yoonessi filed the instant charge. As he had 
knowledge of the testimony given at the deposition before he 
filed the charge, it was not, as he characterizes it in his 
exceptions, "new evidence". 
^Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. O'Neill. 499 U.S. 65, 136 LRRM 
2721, 2726 (1991) . 
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litigation of allegations of misconduct which had been raised 
against him by the State. In these circumstances, and there 
being no other facts alleged which would support a finding that 
UUP's agreement with the State was arbitrary, the Acting Director 
correctly dismissed his charge. 
Based upon the foregoing, the exceptions are denied and the 
decision of the Acting Director is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: November 20, 1996 
Albany, New York 
,U X- K\^l\> 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
'^frU/L. 
Eric J./Schmertz, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4487 
COUNTY OF GENESEE, 
Employer. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (JEROME LEFKOWITZ of 
counsel), for Petitioner 
HARTER, SECREST & EMERY (RONALD J. MENDRICK and DAVID M. 
KRESOCK of counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the County of 
Genesee (County) to a decision issued jointly by the Acting 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Acting Director) and an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)-' on a 
petition filed by the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA). After a hearing, the Acting 
Director/ALJ found that a unit consisting of four head nurses and 
i'The decision was issued by both the ALJ and the Acting Director 
in response to a decision by Supreme Court in Union-Endicott 
Cent. Sch. Dist. v. PERB. 29 PERB 57004 (March 1996). In 
relevant part, Supreme Court held that a decision in a 
representation case must be made by the person who conducted the 
hearing, in this case, the ALJ. Supreme Court's decision was 
recently reversed on appeal. A.D.2d , 29 PERB f7020 
(3d Dep't Nov. 7, 1996). 
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six supervising nurses employed at the County's nursing home was 
most appropriate. The County had argued that these ten 
unrepresented employees were most appropriately added to CSEA's 
existing unit of approximately 200 nursing personnel. The 
primary basis for the Acting Director's/ALJ's contrary conclusion 
was that the head and supervising nurses directly supervised the 
employees in CSEA's existing unit and that the supervision was 
"of a nature likely to cause a conflict of interest . . . ." 
Also cited as factors favoring a separate unit were the head 
nurses' and supervising nurses' exercise of professional judgment 
and the head nurses' involvement in obtaining reimbursement funds 
and their attendance at monthly meetings chaired by the 
administrator of the nursing home. 
The County argues in its exceptions that the Acting 
Director/ALJ misapplied precedent in a decision which is not 
supported by the facts in the record. According to the County, 
the record establishes that head nurses and supervising nurses do 
not have any significant supervisory duties or responsibilities 
which might warrant a separate unit for them. There being no 
reasonable basis to conclude that the addition of the head nurses 
and supervising nurses to CSEA's existing unit would create any 
sharp conflicts of interest, the County argues that a separate 
unit should not have been found most appropriate. 
CSEA' argues in response that there is established on the 
record a reasonable basis to conclude that the inclusion of the 
head and supervising nurses within the rank-and-file unit would 
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create a conflict of interest arising from their supervisory 
status, a conflict exacerbated by the disparity in certain of the 
terms and conditions of employment applicable to the current unit 
employees and the head nurses and supervising nurses. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we reverse the Acting Director/AU decision. 
There is no prohibition against mixed units of supervisors 
and rank-and-file employees. Such units are not and never have 
been per se inappropriate under the Act. It is the nature and 
level of supervisory functions which have always determined 
whether a mixed unit of supervisors and subordinates is most 
appropriate or a unit of supervisors separate from the rank-and-
file is most appropriate. As summarized in Uniondale Union Free 
School District.V it is the community/conflict of interest and 
the employer's administrative convenience standards set forth in 
§201.7 (a) and (c) of the Act which determine the appropriate 
uniting of previously unrepresented supervisors. Here, the 
County's articulated administrative convenience favors a 
placement of the head and supervising nurses within CSEA's 
existing unit to avoid a proliferation of units. Relevant 
factors in the community/conflict of interest inquiry center on 
the significance of the supervisory responsibilities and the 
alleged disparity of benefits for we do not consider the other 
factors mentioned in the Acting Director/ALT decision to 
establish a community or conflict of interest which would dictate 
2/21 PERB 1[3060 (1988) . 
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either their inclusion within or exclusion from CSEA's existing 
unit. These other factors simply have not been shown to have any 
real effect upon unit employees' terms and conditions of 
employment and they are not inherently likely to be any source of 
working or bargaining conflict. 
In Unatego Central School District (hereafter Unatego),^ 
the Board rejected a disparity of benefits as a basis to exclude 
a group of unrepresented employees from an existing unit where 
the inclusion of the unrepresented employees within an existing 
unit would otherwise be most appropriate. In Unatego, the 
benefits enjoyed by the teachers in the existing unit were 
"substantially greater" than those of the long-term substitutes 
the incumbent union sought to add to its existing unit. 
Notwithstanding this disparity, the Board reversed the Director's 
decision, in which the Director had found a separate unit for the 
substitutes to be most appropriate, and ordered them added to the 
existing teachers' unit notwithstanding the employer's 
opposition. 
The disparity in benefits between the head and supervising 
nurses and the nursing personnel in CSEA's existing unit is 
substantially less than the disparity in Unatego. If the greater 
disparity of benefits in Unatego did not preclude a finding that 
an overall unit was most appropriate, a fortiori, the much lesser 
disparity here cannot dictate the appropriateness of separate 
units. 
s/15 PERB H3097 (1982). 
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We are, therefore, left with the primary basis for the 
Acting Director/ALJ decision and the focus of the parties7 
arguments on appeal. The question is whether the supervisory 
duties and responsibilities of either or both the head nurses and 
supervising nurses are of a nature and level "significant" enough 
to create a reasonable likelihood that a combined unit will 
create conflicts of interest and outweigh the strong community of 
interest arising from a common professional status and mission. 
The analysis necessary to answer the question presented is 
essentially fact specific and it is a disagreement with the 
Acting Director's/ALT's findings of fact which constitutes the 
essence of the County's exceptions. In general summary, it is 
quite simply the County's position that the record does not 
establish that either the head nurses or the supervising nurses 
perform any significant supervisory duties or have any 
significant supervisory responsibilities. The primary 
responsibility of head nurses, according to the County, is the 
coordination of resident care within the nursing units, one 
shared equally by the supervising nurses, who also coordinate 
staffing levels under established procedures. 
Because the uniting determination in this type of case is so 
highly fact specific, we have carefully reviewed the record and 
have concluded from that review that, contrary to the Acting 
Director's/AU's findings, head nurses and supervising nurses do 
not have duties of a nature and level significant enough to 
necessitate a separate unit for them. 
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As the County emphasizes in its arguments, and CSEA admits, 
the nurses who are the subject of this petition do not have a 
supervisory role in hiring, discharge, promotion or grievance 
administration. Indeed, the head nurses and supervising nurses 
have responsibility on a regular basis for only two supervisory 
functions of significance to us. Both the head and supervising 
nurses have as the defining characteristic of their job a 
responsibility to ensure that resident care is delivered 
according to prescribed plans. To that end, the County requires 
that they direct their subordinates on a daily basis and that 
they both formally and informally evaluate their subordinates7 
job performance. Their daily direction of staff, however, is but 
an incident of control attributable to their professional status, 
higher skills, or nursing experience. That direction is given in 
the interest of patient care and is exercised pursuant to 
relevant professional nursing standards, much as direction is 
offered by others in the existing unit. For example, registered 
nurses may direct licensed practical nurses who in turn may 
direct nursing assistants. We simply do not consider direction 
of this type for this purpose to constitute significant 
supervisory authority requiring or warranting an exclusion of the 
head and supervisory nurses from a rank-and-file unit. 
The implications of a contrary conclusion for the uniting of 
professional employees is of great concern to us. As with mixed 
units of supervisors and subordinates, mixed units of 
professional and other employees are not per se inappropriate 
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under the Act. Most professionals supervise in the sense that 
they have authority to assign tasks to others and to responsibly 
direct their work. If any person who regularly assigns tasks to 
others or who directs their work is possessed of significant 
supervisory authority for that reason alone, then most 
professional employees would be entitled to separate units as of 
right. Such overfragmentation and undue proliferation of units 
would be flatly contrary to the policies of the Act. 
Although the head nurses' and supervising nurses' 
responsibility to evaluate subordinates is a more typical example 
of significant supervisory authority, it is one which is 
ultimately unpersuasive to us of a need for a separate unit in 
this case. These evaluations, required by law and County policy, 
do not effect changes in employees' terms and conditions of 
employment. Any action to be taken pursuant to these 
evaluations, favorable or unfavorable, is within the control of 
the County's Director of Nursing and its Nursing Home 
Administrator, who approve all evaluations. 
We are not unmindful, as this record confirms, that the 
direction and evaluation functions can and have caused tensions 
between supervisors and subordinates, the latter at least 
perceiving the direction and evaluation as criticism or as 
actions which can lead to discipline or other adverse personnel 
actions. There are, however, multiple sources of tension within 
a workplace cutting across all levels of employees. Unless we 
were to establish a per se supervisory exclusion rule, which we 
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never have been willing to do, tensions, real or imagined, 
stemming from supervisor-subordinate relationships are not 
entitled to more weight in making a unit determination than any 
other of the myriad sources of workplace pressures and strains 
which can affect employees. 
We are also aware that the supervising nurses in this case 
have other supervisory responsibilities such as making overtime 
assignments, granting or denying requests for emergency leaves of 
absence, setting and maintaining staffing levels on shifts and 
verifying time and attendance for payroll purposes. The duties 
in these areas, however, either occupy only a small part of the 
supervising nurses7 job, are undertaken by them irregularly, are 
performed within specific guidelines, or are insubstantial in 
their effect upon employees. None of these several miscellaneous 
duties, singly or in combination, would warrant a separate unit 
for supervising nurses only. 
In summary, we conclude that neither head nurses nor 
supervising nurses have any significant supervisory duties or 
responsibilities which would preclude their being represented 
within CSEA's existing unit. However, should substantial 
conflicts in fact arise in the future as a result of the 
inclusion of the head and supervising nurses into CSEA's existing 
unit, we would be willing to consider a petition seeking a 
reconfiguration of that unit. 
For the reasons set forth above, the Acting Director's/ALJ's 
decision is reversed and the County's exceptions are granted. 
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There being no question of CSEA's majority status, the head 
nurses and supervising nurses are hereby added to CSEA's existing 
nursing unit at the Genesee County Nursing Home. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: November 20, 1996 
Albany, New York 
guLuiLL^.. 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
^ STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PRASANNA W. GOONEWARDENA, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-14748 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Respondent, 
-and-
STATE OF NEW YORK (SUNY HEALTH SCIENCE 
CENTER AT BROOKLYN), 
Employer. 
PRASANNA W. GOONEWARDENA, pro se, and BERNARD W. 
GOONEWARDENA, for Charging Party 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (PAMELA BAISLEY Of 
counsel), for Respondent 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (RICHARD MCDOWELL Of 
counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Prasanna W. 
Goonewardena to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALT) 
dismissing his improper practice charge alleging that the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
(CSEA) violated §209-a.2(a) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) by refusing to represent him at a March 10, 
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1993 interrogation-7 and by coercing him to sign a settlement 
agreement on sexual harassment charges in an attempt to cover up 
the alleged misconduct of another employee in the unit 
represented by CSEA. Goonewardena's employer, the State of 
New York (SUNY Health Science Center at Brooklyn)(State), was 
made a party to the proceeding pursuant to §209-a.3 of the Act. 
The ALJ dismissed as untimely the allegations in the charge 
relating to the March 10, 1993 questioning of Goonewardena 
without representation. The charge was filed on July 26, 1993. 
Therefore, as the March 10, 1993 interrogation occurred more than 
four months prior to the filing of the charge,-7 the ALJ 
correctly dismissed the allegations related to it. 
The remainder of Goonewardena's charge alleges that as a 
result of the March 10 questioning, during which the other 
employee's alleged misconduct on January 31, 1993 and in February 
1993 was discussed, allegations of Goonewardena's own sexual 
harassment of the employee were also investigated. Goonewardena, 
who was at all times relevant to the charge a probationary 
employee, could have been terminated with two weeks notice 
-'Goonewardena was to be questioned by Steven Greenblatt, the 
Director of Labor Relations at the SUNY Health Science Center at 
Brooklyn, about another employee's abrupt departure, in February 
1993, from the switchboard area where they both worked. During 
the interrogation of both Goonewardena and the other employee on 
March 10, Goonewardena was questioned about an incident of sexual 
harassment which allegedly occurred on January 31, 1993, and a 
confrontation arising from that incident between Goonewardena and 
the other employee in February, which prompted the other employee 
to leave Goonewardena alone in the switchboard area. 
^Rules of Procedure, §204.1(a). 
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because of his actions.-7 However, Rick Ford, the CSEA local 
vice-president, who had represented the other employee, who is 
permanent, at the March 10 interrogation, interceded on 
Goonewardena's behalf with Greenblatt. Ford testified that 
Goonewardena had sought his assistance in retaining his position 
and that he wanted to help Goonewardena because he was young, had 
not intended to sexually harass the other employee by his remarks 
and was sincerely interested in continuing his employment with 
the State. Therefore, Ford, after learning that Greenblatt 
intended to terminate Goonewardena because of his conduct, 
advocated for Goonewardena. As Greenblatt testified, Ford wore 
him down and Greenblatt agreed on or about March 30 that 
Goonewardena could continue his employment if he agreed to the 
terms set forth by Greenblatt in the settlement agreement. 
Greenblatt gave the agreement to Ford to obtain Goonewardena's 
signature. 
Goonewardena alleges that Ford coerced him into signing a 
"last chance" settlement agreement on March 31, 1993, by 
physically threatening him and by telling him that if he did not 
sign the agreement, he would be terminated. The agreement, while 
allowing Goonewardena to keep his job, contained an admission 
that Goonewardena had engaged in sexual harassment toward a co-
^Provisions in the State-CSEA collective bargaining agreement 
setting forth the disciplinary procedure specifically exclude 
probationary employees. 
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worker which could have resulted in his termination.-7 
Goonewardena also acknowledged in the agreement that he had 
consulted with his CSEA representative and that he was 
voluntarily entering into the agreement. Goonewardena was 
subsequently terminated by the State in June 1993 due to various 
complaints by other co-workers and his supervisors. Goonewardena 
argues that his termination would not have taken place but for 
the provisions of the March 31, 1993 agreement. 
The ALJ dismissed the charge, finding that CSEA had not 
breached its duty of fair representation. 
Goonewardena excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that the 
ALJ erred in crediting the testimony of Ford and Greenblatt, in 
) her conduct of the hearing and in finding that CSEA had not 
violated the Act. CSEA and the State support the decision of the 
ALJ. 
After a review of the record and consideration of the 
parties' arguments, we affirm the ALT's decision. 
Goonewardena argues in his exceptions that the ALJ 
suppressed evidence, disallowed questions and refused to subpoena 
-'The agreement also extended Goonewardena's probationary period 
from December 3, 1993 to June 3, 1994, changed his shift, imposed 
a monetary penalty and the loss of one week of annual leave 
accruals, and contained an agreement to attend sexual harassment 
training and to avoid the other employee, and a waiver of any 
rights to appeal in any forum a termination for violating the 
terms of the agreement. 
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witnesses on his behalf.^ A careful review of the record 
reveals that this was not the case. To the contrary, the ALJ 
allowed Goonewardena and his representative a great deal of 
latitude in pleading and presenting Goonewardena's case. We, 
therefore, find no merit in Goonewardena's argument that the ALJ 
erred in either her rulings or the general conduct of the 
hearing. 
There is no credible evidence in the record to support 
Goonewardena's assertion that Ford coerced him into signing the 
March 31 settlement agreement. The ALJ credited the testimony of 
Ford and Greenblatt and we find nothing in the record which would 
warrant disturbing her credibility resolution. Ford, recognizing 
that Goonewardena was likely to be terminated after the March 10 
interrogation, convinced Greenblatt to continue Goonewardena's 
employment. Greenblatt imposed certain conditions which Ford 
related to Goonewardena with the accurate statement that 
Goonewardena would be terminated if he did not agree to 
Greenblatt's conditions and sign the agreement. This was not a 
threat but a statement of fact. The ALJ further found no 
credible evidence that Ford physically threatened Goonewardena. 
Indeed, it is extremely unlikely that such a threat was made, 
given the efforts Ford expended to save Goonewardena's job. If, 
as posited by Goonewardena, Ford was trying to make Goonewardena 
-'Neither Goonewardena nor his uncle, Bernard Goonewardena, who 
represented him at the hearing and filed the exceptions on his 
behalf, are attorneys or labor relations professionals. 
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a scapegoat to cover up the alleged misconduct of the other 
employee who was interviewed on March 10, he could have 
legitimately done nothing for Goonewardena, who would have then 
been terminated by Greenblatt. 
There is no evidence on this record that CSEA acted in an 
arbitrary or discriminatory manner toward Goonewardena or that it 
acted in bad faith. The settlement agreement, while containing 
stringent conditions, did allow Goonewardena to continue his 
employment. The agreement did extend Goonewardena's probationary 
term, but it was his subsequent actions, which were unrelated to 
the settlement agreement and which arose during his original 
probationary period, that caused Greenblatt to terminate him. 
Neither the settlement agreement itself nor Ford's actions in 
bringing it about breach CSEA's duty of fair representation. To 
the contrary, CSEA, through Ford, gave Goonewardena help when it 
had no obligation to do so and it is this type of union 
representation which should be encouraged, not condemned as 
improper. 
Based on the foregoing, Goonewardena's exceptions are 
dismissed and the ALJ's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: November 20, 1996 
Albany, New York 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
JAMES J. BURTON/ 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-17390 
VERNON VERONA SHERRILL TEACHERS 
ASSOCIATION, 
Respondent. 
JAMES J. BURTON, pro se 
JAMES R. SANDNER, GENERAL COUNSEL (IVOR R. MOSKOWITZ Of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Vernon 
Verona Sherrill Teachers Association (Association) to a decision 
by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The ALJ held that the 
Association had violated §209-a.2(a) of the Public Employees7 
Fair Employment Act (Act) by failing to provide James J. Burton, 
a unit member who is not a member of the Association, with an 
advance reduction of his agency shop fee for 1995-96 and by 
refusing to allow him to appeal the Association's calculation of 
the amount of the agency shop fee under its agency shop fee 
procedure. The Association denied that Burton had filed an 
agency shop fee objection for 1995-96. 
Burton is not now, nor has he ever been, a member of the 
Association. He has filed agency shop fee objections for each of 
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the three years prior to 1995-96 that the Association has had an 
agency shop fee refund procedure in place.-7 In each of those 
years, Burton placed his agency shop fee objection in the school 
mailbox of the Association's president, Edward Patricia. The 
Association acquiesced in Burton's use of the school mailbox; 
indeed, Patricia utilized the school mailboxes to communicate 
with Burton on agency fee matters over a period of years. The 
ALT found that on May 15, 1995, Burton placed his written 
objection in Patricia's school mailbox. The ALJ further found 
that Patricia did not receive the objection. In September, 1995, 
an agency shop fee was deducted from Burton's paycheck.-1 He 
objected in writing, placing his complaint in Patricia's school 
mailbox on October 2, 1995. Patricia replied by a memo dated 
October 17, 1995, apprising Burton that as he had not received 
Burton's objection during the appropriate time frame, his request 
for an agency fee reduction was denied, but noting that if Burton 
could produce a copy of his letter and proof of mailing, Patricia 
would consider his request. Burton provided Patricia with a copy 
-'The Association's procedure for 1995-96 provides that 
"objections shall be made, if at all, by individually notifying 
the Union President by mail during the period between May 15 and 
June 15, 1995." 
-
7Under the Association's 1995-96 agency shop fee refund 
procedure, Burton should have received an advance reduction of 
the agency shop fee in August 1995. Burton testified that he 
believed that the Association had decided, pursuant to his 
objections in prior years, not to deduct any agency fees from him 
for 1995-96 and, therefore, an advance reduction was not 
necessary. 
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of his objection letter and proof that his objection was 
computer-generated on the date he claimed. He further noted: 
As has been done in the past, without your objection, I 
personally placed my original objection in your school 
mailbox on May 15, 1995. Due to circumstances which 
were out of my control, you are now denying that you 
ever received this objection letter. 
...I made that notification to you via the school mail 
system. 
...I assume at this time that we must proceed to 
arbitration as established in your procedure. 
Patricia responded by a memo of November 30, 1995, denying 
Burton's request and further informing him: 
After several communications with NYSUT staff, I have 
been instructed to inform you of the following: 
The procedures adopted by fthe Association! with 
respect to the Agency Fee are designed to comply with 
the law and to avoid disputes over compliance. The 
procedures reguire the use of mail. Most legal experts 
advise Registered Mail for your own protection. You 
chose to follow your own procedure, and we did not 
receive a timely objection. We. therefore, have no 
further obligation to you for the current year. 
(Emphasis in original.) 
The ALJ found that Burton had properly filed his objection 
for 1995-96 and that Patricia never received it. The ALJ also 
determined that service by using the U.S. Postal Service was not, 
and never had been, a requirement of the Association's procedure. 
Having found that Burton had met the procedure's filing 
requirements, the ALJ found that the Association violated 
§209-a.2(a) of the Act when it refused to process Burton's 
objection, and she ordered the Association to refund to Burton 
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the total amount of agency shop fees deducted from his salary for 
the 1995-96 fiscal year, with interest at the maximum legal rate. 
The Association excepts to the ALT's decision, arguing that 
she erred in finding that Burton had properly complied with the 
procedure. The Association further argues that even if it were 
found that Burton had complied with its procedure's filing 
requirements, the appropriate remedy is to order the Association 
to process Burton's objection. Burton supports the ALJ's 
decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of the 
parties' arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALT, but modify 
the remedy. 
The ALJ's credibility resolutions are consistent with the 
record and are not mutually exclusive. Burton, following the 
procedure he utilized in each of the prior three years, filed a 
timely objection. The Association failed to process the 
objection because it did not receive it. However, the 
Association's procedure is keyed to filing, not receipt. Having 
been made aware of Burton's objection, the Association, by its 
own procedure, was obligated to process it. When the Association 
refused to do so, it violated §209-a.2(a) of the Act. 
As to the remedy ordered by the ALT, we have generally found 
that a failure to abide by the requirements of the Act regarding 
the collection of agency shop fees warrants a refund of any fees 
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collected from the objector in the year in question.^ Unlike 
those cases, where the procedure itself was found defective, thus 
depriving those employee organizations of their right to agency 
shop fee deductions, Burton does not here allege that the 
Association's agency shop fee refund procedure is defective, but 
rather, that it was not properly followed. In this case, Burton 
complied with the steps of the Association's agency shop fee 
refund procedure, as implemented by the Association. The 
Association should have then processed Burton's objection upon 
notification that he had complied with its procedure. As the 
Association did not do so, the appropriate remedy is to place 
Burton in the position in which he would have been if the 
Association had continued with its procedure. Had Burton's 
objection been noted, he would have received an advance reduction 
of the agency shop fee for 1995-96 and then he could have sought 
a refund of any amounts in excess of the reduction to which he 
thought he was entitled. By ordering the Association to process 
the objection, we address and remedy the violation alleged and 
found, making Burton whole for the consequences of the 




7See, e.g., United Univ. Professions, 20 PERB f3039 (1987). 
-'Section 205.5(d) of the Act prohibits the award of punitive 
damages and affords us the power to order make-whole relief only. 
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For the reasons set forth above, we deny the Association's 
exceptions and we affirm the decision of the ALJ, except as to 
the remedy. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Association immediately 
process Burton's objection for the 1995-96 fiscal year, and that 
interest be paid at the rate of nine percent per annum on any 
advance reduction and/or subsequent refund from the time that 
Burton would have received them if his objection had been 
processed as timely filed under the Association's 1995-96 agency 
shop fee refund procedure. 
We concur with the ALJ that given the unique circumstances 
of this case and as no other unit employees were affected, a 
posting of notice of violation is not necessary or appropriate. 
DATED: November 20, 1996 
Albany, New York 
e R. Kinsella, CI Paulin hairperson 
-^C/tAy^yuUi^ 
Eric J. /Schmertz, Membe 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ORLEANS COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFFS' ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4442 




SECURITY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT EMPLOYEES, 
COUNCIL 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the- authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Orleans County Deputy 
Sheriffs' Association has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit found to be appropriate and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
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negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full-time employees in the following 
titles: deputy sheriff, deputy sheriff 
investigator, lieutenant-road patrol, major. 
Excluded: All other employees of the Sheriff's Department. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Orleans County Deputy 
Sheriffs' Association. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. lSuch obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: November 20, 1996 
Albany, New York 
lline- R. Kinsella,' CE hairperson 
A— 
Eric J./Schmertz, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ROOSEVELT ISLAND PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICERS 
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4550 
ROOSEVELT ISLAND OPERATING CORPORATION, 
Employer, 
-and-
UNITED FEDERATION OF POLICE, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Roosevelt Island Public 
Safety Officers Benevolent Association has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
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Unit: Included: Employees employed by the 
employer as public safety 
officers and sergeants. 
Excluded: All other employees, including supervisory, 
confidential, office, executive and managerial 
employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Roosevelt Island Public 
Safety Officers Benevolent Association. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: November 2.9, 1996 
Albany, New York 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
I.B.E.W., LOCAL UNION #3 63, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4585 
TOWN OF GREENVILLE, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the I.B.E.W., Local Union #3 63 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by 
the parties and described below, as their exclusive represent-
ative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All highway department employees. 
Excluded: All elected officials. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
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shall negotiate collectively with the I.B.E.W., Local Union #363. 
The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation 
to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect 
to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or 
the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement 
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: November 20, 1996 
Albany, New York 
IU^TML 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
#6A011/20/96 
GRIEVANCE AND INTEREST ARBITRATION PANELS 
A candidate for appointment to the grievance arbitration 
panel must demonstrate satisfactory experience as a labor 
arbitrator. Applications for appointment to the panel must 
include the applicant's vita, five recent arbitration awards 
written by the applicant, and a listing of all awards rendered in 
the past two years, such listing to include the names of the 
parties, the nature of the issue(s) involved, and the appointing 
authority. Exceptions to the arbitration award requirements may 
be made for persons who have five or more years of relevant and 
appropriate professional employment with a federal, state or 
municipal agency charged with the administration of a labor 
relations statute and who, by education, training, experience or 
other objective criteria, can demonstrate such outstanding 
competence and stature in the field of labor relations as to 
assure the Board of their ability to serve effectively as a labor 
arbitrator, and such that their appointment to the panel would be 
of substantial value to the agency, its clientele and public. 
Individuals having at least ten years of professional employment 
with a federal or state agency responsible for administration of 
a public sector labor relations statute are deemed qualified by 
the Board for admission to the panel, and will be appointed to 
the panel on reguest. Candidates must be residents of, or 
maintain bona fide business offices within, the State of New 
York, or a location immediately contiguous thereto. Consistent 
with staffing needs and caseload demands, the Director of 
Conciliation should recommend to the Board such persons as are 
determined to have met the necessary standards and criteria. 
A candidate for appointment to the interest arbitration 
panel must demonstrate substantial experience both as a labor 
mediator and labor arbitrator, and must be a member of PERB's 
mediation, fact-finding and grievance arbitration panels. 
Individuals having at least ten years of professional employment 
with a federal or state agency responsible for administration of 
a public sector labor relations statute are deemed gualified by 
the Board for admission to the panel, and will be appointed to 
the panel on reguest. Consistent with staffing needs and 
caseload demands, the Director of Conciliation should recommend 
to the Board such persons as are determined to have met the 
necessary standards and criteria. 
A member of the grievance or interest arbitration panel may 
be removed by the Board for good reason as determined by the 
Board, including, without limitation, a failure, refusal or 
inability to comply with or maintain any of the standards, 
criteria or policies governing appointment to or service on a 
panel, such as service as an advocate in matters of labor 
relations or labor standards, or extended periods in which a 
member is not selected or assigned to a dispute despite 
availability. 
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MEDIATION AND FACT-FINDING PANELS 
A candidate for appointment to the mediation and fact-
finding panels must demonstrate by education, training and 
experience, or other objective criteria, an ability to serve 
effectively as a labor mediator or fact finder. Individuals 
having at least ten years of professional employment with a 
federal or state agency responsible for administration of a 
public sector labor relations statute are deemed qualified by the 
Board for admission to the panels, and will be appointed to the 
panels on request. Candidates must be residents of, or maintain 
bona fide business offices within, the State of New York, or a 
location immediately contiguous thereto. Consistent with 
staffing needs and caseload demands, the Director of Conciliation 
should recommend to the Board such persons as are determined to 
have met the necessary standards and criteria. 
A member of the mediation or fact-finding panel may be 
removed by the Board in the same manner and upon the same terms 
as members of the grievance and interest arbitration panels. 
